ABSTRACT: The struggle between the Democratic and Communist camps in Vietnam is analyzed with respect to its characteristics and essential elements. I propose a model of the struggle using the theory of complex adaptive systems. This theory states that the natural local interactions among the agents, though unorganized but aiming at a common ideal for freedom, democracy, and human rights, will lead, quite unexpectedly, to the emergence of an ordered structure having a strength that exceeds all the strengths of the collective agents. This analysis concludes that the Democratic camp will eventually win with certainty if the Communist camp continues to maintain its current ideals and objectives.
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In any struggle having opposing forces, there is a basic principle: “If you know yourself and your enemy, you will win in a hundred battles.” The principle is simple, but is not easy to implement for at least two reasons. First, not everyone is able to know his own strengths and weaknesses, let alone those of his enemy. Second, even if a contender has this knowledge, the ability to use it strategically to gain advantage in the struggle is far from certain.
In Vietnam’s two opposing camps, the Communist camp (CC) is the one that is in power and includes the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP), the communist government, and those who serve the VCP. The Democratic camp (DC) is not in power but includes all the people, residing in Vietnam and overseas, who fight for human rights, freedom, and democracy for Vietnam. Other camps exist in Vietnam and overseas, such as the Anti-communist camp, the Reconciliation and Concord camp, various political parties, and a number of so-called disguised camps. The DC and the Anti-communist camps have some differences regarding their views toward the CC, but they are actually similar during the present stage of the struggle. Within the narrow scope of this article, I consider the DC and the Anti-communist camps to have shared beliefs and goals, which stand in direct opposition to those in the Communist camp.
I - NATURE OF THE STRUGGLE
In any struggle, it is important that the parties involved understand the nature of the struggle. Otherwise, the participants may not define their ideals and objectives accurately and may therefore pursue strategies that are erroneous or inefficient. In the struggle between the CC and DC in Vietnam, this issue is critical because the tragedy that Vietnam now faces is the result of many of its combatants not correctly understanding the nature of incidents in the past almost one hundred years.
The struggle between the CC and DC has usually been defined according to each side’s point of view as follows:
The DC’s view of the conflict is that the people’s opposition to the CC government is a revolution or a civil disobedience.
The CC’s view is that the government must suppress the DC to bring about social order because the DC violates the laws.
Both views are mistaken or only true in a very narrow scope. Let’s look at aspects related to these views in some detail, starting with the CC.
The CC brings foreign doctrines to dominate the Vietnamese people and it does not represent the Vietnamese people:
First, the Communist regime from 1945 in the North and 1975 in the South is a regime of foreign origins, having nothing to do with the Vietnamese way of life. Marxism and Leninism originated in Germany and Russia to promote the rising up of the proletariat in opposition to the bourgeoise. It was a class struggle. Even when Lenin tried to introduce anti-colonialism in his thesis to get support from countries that were under colonial dominion, his doctrine did not deviate much from the nature of the class revolution. In the early 20th century, Vietnam was under French dominion. The struggle of the Vietnamese people at the time was not a class struggle; it was a struggle against colonialism. Importing a theory about class struggle into the real fight against colonialism was sheer distortion. In fact, the battle against colonialism didn’t need any theory or doctrine. Vietnam leaders Nguyễn Thái Học, Hoàng Hoa Thám, Trương Công Định, Nguyễn Trung Trực fought the colonial French without relying on any foreign doctrines. The idea that patriotism opposing colonialism has to rely on communism as its ally is incredibly absurd. The Vietnamese had resisted foreign domination or invasion for thousands of years, fighting against the Chinese, the Mongols, and the Qing.
After the war, the CC continued following Marxist-Leninism and tried to modify this theory to suit conditions in Vietnam. But up to now, the persistent decline of Vietnam in all aspects relative to the country’s potential, despite its large young and dynamic work force when compared to other similarly situated countries, has shown that Marxist-Lenism, regardless how much it has been corrected, cannot advance this country.
Second, regarding the entity characteristic, the CC usurped power in 1945 in the North and in 1975 in the South. The CC has never been elected by the people; hence, it has never been a legitimate government entity. The CC usurped power by political ploys and violence in September 1945 in the North thanks to the unexpected political vacuum in Indochina right after Japan surrendered to the Allies (Buttinger 1967, 296-297; Dân 2012) and by claiming to have had the support of the United States (See, for example, Cao-Đắc 2014a, 347-348; Cao-Đắc 2014b; Chen 1969, 108; Lacouture 1968, 269). In April 1975, the CC violated the 1973 Paris Agreements and took control in the South thanks to the total withdrawal of American troops; the lack of ammunition, materials, and equipment of the South Armed Forces; and the increasing military assistance from the then Soviet Union and communist Chinese.
Proof that Communism was never freely chosen by the people is found in Vietnam’s first national election, which occurred on January 6, 1946. In the South, 90% of those eligible voted, but the elections were held only in areas under Vietminh’s control (Duiker 2000, 353). Most of the voters didn’t know any of the candidates and they asked the election staff to write down on the voting tickets the selected candidates’ names for them (Nguyễn 2012, 45). Moreover, the elections had been arranged between the Communists and the Nationalists. Among the 300 total seats in the National Assembly, 70 seats would be guaranteed for the Nationalists, regardless of the results of the elections (Duiker 2000, 352). With such a guaranteed agreement, coupled with the fact that in the South there were elections only in areas under communist control, how was it possible to have a free and open democratic election? After the communists seized power with a single political party, up to the present, it has been impossible to have a free and democratic election.
Seizing power by violent means, by itself, is not wrong if: (1) violence is the only way to seize power, (2) the power that is taken away belonged to an illegitimate, cruel or incompetent government, and (3) after seizing power the usurper returns it to the people. The CC violated all three conditions; therefore, it is merely an illegal usurper and opportunistic plunderer. Not only did the plunder originate from the time the CC was formed, but it also has continued until now, and will continue in the future. Furthermore, the CC ruins the national economy, allows corruption to spread in all levels of government, and conspires with communist China to sell for personal benefit what it has taken from the Vietnamese people to communist China, the hereditary enemy of Vietnam.
The struggle of the DC is not a revolution:
Because of the above two reasons, the struggle of the DC is not a revolution. Calling it a revolution amounts to recognizing the legitimacy of the CC. The CC merely imitates foreigners to govern Vietnam and takes away what belongs to the Vietnamese people. Fighting against such a traitorous usurper cannot ever be called revolution. Struggling to retake what once belonged to the people cannot be called revolution. Hai Bà Trưng, Ngô Quyền, Lê Lợi were not revolutionaries. They rose up to expel the foreign rulers.
What is a revolution? (In this article, I use “revolution” in a narrow context of revolution against a government.) It’s hard to have a precise definition for “revolution” even when talking about politics. In addition, there are many words close to “revolution,” that can easily cause confusion. These words are: rebellion, revolt, uprising, coup d'etat, usurpation, insurrection, and resistance. Tocqueville “defined it as an overthrow of the legally constituted elite, which initiated a period of intense social, political, and economic change” (Tanter and Midlarsky 1967, 265). Arendt interprets the revolutionary experience as a restoration of “liberties and privileges which were lost as the result of government’s temporary lapse into despotism” (ibid., 264). The Marxist “sees revolution as a product of irresistible historical forces, which culminate in a struggle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat” (ibid.). Tocqueville and Arendt’s views seem to be closest to the current struggle in Vietnam, because both focus on the vast changes in society and politics.
Upon close examination, in their definitions of revolution, Tocqueville and Arendt both assert the existence of the legitimate government that the revolution wants to overthrow. Legitimacy here implies that the people have accepted the government for a while with full knowledge of how that government was created, and even likely supported this government before its “lapses into despotism” which cause the people to want to overthrow it. Accordingly, a revolution toppling a ruling government always implies that the ruling government was established legitimately and had the people’s acceptance at the time of its establishment. The American Revolution in 1765 – 1783 and the French revolution in 1789 – 1799 are two typical examples.
To repeat, the CC is not a legitimate government. It looks very much like the invaders invading and ruling Vietnam. It should be noted that the CC abuses the names of revolution and resistance when referring to their usurpation or terrorism. This is a very obvious issue that needs no further discussion. The only difference between the CC and a foreign invasion force is that the CC are themselves Vietnamese who rule the Vietnamese people. Because the CC is not a legitimate government, the fight against the CC cannot be a revolution, even if its objectives – complete changes in society, politics, and economy – are similar to those of other types of revolution. The distinction may be only academic because many people don’t care what kind of ruling government there is, as long there is a complete or significant change. However, in the current struggle in Vietnam, this distinction is very important because it is related to the factors of the struggle, especially the righteous nature of the DC and the evil deeds of the CC.
The struggle of the DC is not a civil disobedience:
Civil disobedience is defined as “a knowing violation of a public norm (considered binding by local authorities but which may ultimately be invalidated by the courts) as a form of protest; it is nonrevolutionary, public, and nonviolent (i.e., there is no use of physical violence except self-defensively when participants are physically attacked, and no resistance to arrest if made properly and without undue force.)”(Zashin 1972, 118). The significant aspect of a civil disobedience is the possibility that the courts will invalidate the public norm. In reality, the courts in Vietnam are the CC’s instrument. Therefore, the probability that the courts will invalidate the public norm is nil. If there is no hope that the courts will invalidate the norm that the DC is accused of violating, the DC’s struggle cannot be considered a civil disobedience. Furthermore, a civil disobedience usually occurs in a democratic regime. Since democracy does not exist in Vietnam – it is the very thing the DC is fighting for – the DC’s struggle cannot be characterized as a civil disobedience.
The DC does not violate the laws:
The DC does not disrupt the social order and does not violate the laws imposed by the CC. So far, the forms of the DC’s struggle have mostly included peaceful demonstrations, blog posts, peaceful meetings, contacts with international organizations and foreign countries to create political and economic pressure on the CC. These forms do not disrupt social order and do not violate Articles 79, 88, and 258 of the CC.
The struggle of the DC is an uprising to retake the country of Vietnam occupied by the CC:
If the struggle of the DC is not a revolution or a civil disobedience, then what is it? In my opinion, the struggle for democracy in Vietnam is an uprising to retake the country that was occupied by the CC in 1945 in the North and 1975 in the South. The democratic uprising seeks to restore the righteous values trampled by the CC. Another term for “uprising” that is based on its objective might be “restoration of righteousness (phục nghĩa).” (“Righteous rebellion/uprising (Khởi nghĩa)” connotes a meaning different than “restoration of righteous values.”) However, since the expression “restoration of righteousness” (“phục nghĩa”) has never been used, I do not want to invent a new term. The name “restoration of our country” (“phục quốc”) may be more accurate. The problem with this expression is that because the CC has been in power in Vietnam for so long, many people have no idea what their country was like before being occupied by the CC.
Accordingly, the nature of the current struggle in Vietnam must be properly defined as follows.
Under the DC’s view: The entire population rises up to oppose the usurpers of power, overthrows the foreign ideology, and demands the return of things that have been taken away by the CC, at least the chance to live in, or to improve, a country respecting freedom, democracy, and human rights.
Under the CC’s view: The government protects the CC to keep for the CC what has been taken away from the Vietnamese people and maintain the survival of the CC.
Understandably, the CC is not stupid enough to admit its evil role in the struggle. Instead, it uses more innocent language to defend its practices, such as maintaining national security and protecting social stability. However, in reality, the CC only acts according to its self-interests and its survival. Leaders in the CC use this language not only within Vietnam but also on the outside, insisting that they want to protect national security.
The CC may publicly argue that they couldn’t take away things that Vietnam didn’t have. The CC may reason that in Vietnam, freedom, democracy, and human rights did not exist in 1975, and even more so in 1945 because Vietnam was not an independent state at the time. This contention is wrong for several reasons. First, freedom, democracy, and human rights actually existed in South Vietnam before April 30, 1975. The protection of these rights might not have been strong according to today’s international standards, but it certainly was equivalent to that in other free countries at the time. Second, Vietnam actually obtained her independence before September 2, 1945 when Japan recognized Vietnam’s independence (See, for example, Dân 2012). Third, what was taken away was not necessarily the actual existence of freedom and democracy, but merely the opportunity to have these rights. When a kidnapper kidnapped a child and forced the child to be his slave, not allowing the child to go to school, the kidnapper took away the chance for the child to become a college graduate, having a degree like children who were not kidnapped. Even if Vietnam didn’t have freedom, democracy, or human rights at the time the CC usurped power, the chance for the Vietnamese people to eventually obtain these rights under the government whose power was taken away by the CC was very high. It must be the case because all countries having the same fate as Vietnam at the time now enjoy all these rights.
However, many people do not accept this characterization. They believe that what they struggle for is not what has been taken by the CC, but is what the CC has not achieved according to the mission entrusted to the CC by the people. They may reluctantly agree that some freedom and independence, or the chance to have freedom and independence, indeed existed in Vietnam, but they needed improvements, and the CC was given the responsibility by the people to improve the condition. But, according to these people, the CC not only did not improve the condition or fulfill their responsibilities based on the foundation established by the pioneering revolutionaries, it even degenerated the process.
This line of reasoning is completely wrong. As discussed above, importing a foreign doctrine to rally the patriotism fighting colonialism is a fraudulent act. Whoever believed in this appeal to participate in the so-called revolution of the CC may avoid the accusation of being the fraud initiators but cannot avoid the crime of continuing to follow the fraud when the true mask of the CC fell after the massacre of the nationalists in 1946, the CC’s collusion with the French in destroying the nationalists, the incredible massacre in the Land Reform in 1953-1956, the brutal purge in the Nhân Văn Giai Phẩm movement in 1956, the execution of 65,000 people (Sorley 1999, 383) and the imprisonment of hundreds of thousands of people of the former Republic of Vietnam after April 30, 1975.
People embracing the fraud above are often those who had participated in the CC, but later became enlightened and converted to opposing the CC. Whether they are former or present members of the VCP is not important. What matters are the mistakes in reasoning that defends those who started the seizure of power, like Hồ Chí Minh, Lê Duẩn, Trường Chinh, Võ Nguyên Giáp. Moreover, the current situation cannot be more important than the past because what is happening now originates from events that took place in history. Those who want to overthrow the current regime while still believing in the so-called revolution in the past have not understood the essential nature of the current regime. If the flaws of the source are not exposed, these flaws may be repeated, even after the current regime collapses.
It is very important to accurately characterize the nature of the struggle as discussed above to understand fully the elements of the struggle between the two camps. The CC has found, is now finding, and will continue to find every possible way to hide the true nature of this struggle by propagandizing about the people’s resistance against the French, the Americans, and eliminating the puppet government. But history has shown the truth about what the CC did in usurping power to serve its own interests and the interests of the then Soviet Union and communist China. The DC needs to have a firm understanding of the nature of the struggle so that they can describe accurately its elements and promote its ideals and objectives properly.
II - A MODEL FOR THE DEMOCRACY MOVEMENT IN VIETNAM
A field that is currently developing is the theory of complex adaptive systems (CAS) applied to issues of social life. CAS started as a branch in Artificial Intelligence (AI) in computer science and has spread to other fields that involve the "dynamic processes and global patterns that emerge from the collective interactions of a system’s individual components" (Eidelson 1997). CAS has been applied in world politics, social media, and other social phenomena. CAS is usually used to study or model past or current events. In this article, I propose CAS as a framework, which the DC should adopt to achieve success.
The fundamental principle of CAS is as follows: emergence is a phenomenon whereby well-formulated global behavior arises from localized, individual behaviors of agents interacting with one another (Miller and Page 2007, 46). Agents in this context may be a concrete entity (e.g., organization, group) or abstract (e.g., concept, action) (Harrison 2006, 27). Interactions here refer to actions that cause responses or reactions among the agents (e.g., beating, invading territorial waters, protesting, flattering).
Simply stated, when a group of agents, unorganized and having various actions, interact with one another for some time, they will create a well-organized global force. This theory was actually proposed in 1776 by Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations (Joyce 2001). Smith theorized an “invisible hand” that leads the “self-interested agents into well-formed structures that are no part of any single agent’s intention” (Miller and Page 2007, 4). Not all agents or parties are capable of operating that way. There must be a fundamental condition or a parameter that is common to all the agents to transform the localized interacting behaviors into a large unified force.
Figure 1 illustrates the structure of this complex adaptive system. To simplify, the agents are considered concrete entities such as civil society organizations, the intellects, workers, non-government organizations (NGO), the communist government, security agents, and individuals. There are three main camps: the CC, the DC, along with other camps or forces mentioned at the start of this article; (e.g., the reconciliation and concord camp, the disguised camps, communist China, other countries like the United States, the United Nations and international organizations). The localized interactions are the actions or abstract elements, having effects on the agents. The localized interactions of the agents eventually lead to an emergence having a vast force and ordered structure.
Applying this theory to the DC’s struggle indicates that good emergence is likely to occur simply by the naturally localized interactions among the groups in the DC and the CC. What is that emergence? Nobody can predict it. It may be a concrete entity, such as an organization, a temporary committee planning for a long-term institution, or even a new full-fledged government. It may be an abstract concept, such as a righteous behavior, courage, or an indomitable willpower. It may be both a concrete entity and an abstract concept, which co-exist and are integrated together. Whatever it is, it is certainly something that is more than the total of the individual agents and something that can last and grow more and more powerful.
The question is whether these groups have the requirement to create the emergence? In my opnion, that requirement, or the common parameter, is the common will toward the same ideal, That requirement certainly exists in the groups of the DC. That common will will act as an “invisible hand” to bring the DC or anti-communist groups together in a natural manner. I even believe that if we extend the system to include the CC and other camps or forces as shown in Fig. 1, the emergence of the well-formed structure occurs even faster and more solidly. It is because the localized interactions need to have opposing forces to create the momentum that is increasingly strong to transform them into a final global force.
All agents in the system must have some ideal as a common parameter. What is that common ideal? It’s the freedom, democracy, and human rights. The DC certainly pursues this ideal. What about the CC? In reality, the CC people also want to have freedom, democracy, and human rights. In fact, the CC people want these rights more than anybody else, sometimes even an excess of them. The irony is they want them only for themselves, and they do not want the people to have them. The evidence is that they freely travel, express their thoughts freely, have elections in the Politburo, and organize state-sponsored demonstrations. But there is an important difference between the DC and the CC with regard to these ideals. The DC wants freedom, democracy, and human rights for everybody, including the CC, with the distribution of these rights ensuring an equality standard that everybody has exactly the same rights as everybody else, from the poorest to the supreme leader. At present, the CC just wants to keep those rights for themselves, ensuring the distribution of these rights to an elitist hierarchy – the higher the rank the more rights. Because of this fundamental difference between the DC and the CC on the same ideal, the localized interactions will naturally occur, and will create transformations adaptive to these interactions, and coupled with other interactions they will lead to a final unexpected emergence.
People may have doubts about the success of the complex adaptive system. There will be questions like, “How can a system having all kinds of diversified camps lead to a powerful and ordered structure when everybody just does his or her own thing, without following a systematic direction?” The question is certainly valid. True, there is no guarantee that CAS will succeed; and even if it succeeds, there is no guarantee that it will succeed in a short time. However, even if there is no CAS, we all know that everything that occurs occurs for a reason and has effects on others. History is full of such events. For example, the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor drew the United States into World War II, which ultimately resulted in the Japanese surrendering to the Allies and ending the war. In reality, the theory of CAS offers nothing new, but it gives us a model to pursue, a tool to study and, more important to some, a strong belief in success. To people with strong religious inclinations, Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” may be thought of as divine intervention, or God’s interference.
Moreover, not “everybody does his or her own things” independently, because there are local interactions. Agents interact with one another, and usually one thing leads to the next, not many things happen at the same time. In the process of “one thing leading to another,” there will be learning, filtering, and selection. Good things will be repeated or improved to be better. Bad things will be discarded.
The success of CAS depends on a number of factors. In the limited scope of this article, I can only outline the main factors: quality and quantity of the agents, the characteristics of the local interactions, and most importantly, the strength of the common parameter. In the DC’s struggle, individuals of the DC need to have the ability to generate the local interactions and must express that ability appropriately and concretely. That ability is not anything difficult or hard to have; it is simply related to the ideals and the objectives of the struggle. If you are a victim of unjust compensation in government’s eminent domain programs, you must know how to appeal to authority. You cannot stay home and complain. If you are an on-line commentator, you need to write serious comments. You can’t throw out curses or profanity for instant gratification. Cursing, actually, is a form of protest, but you must know how to curse properly. All agents must be patient and resolute. Do not give up in the middle of the struggle. Do not lose your cool and lose your head. Do not feel bitter without justification. Do not despair. All the interactions must be carried out appropriately. The most important elements are the strength of the ideals and the objectives of fighting for freedom, democracy, and human rights. You can’t weaken or abuse them. Those ideals must be what you genuinely pursue, passionately with all your heart. If you are a blogger, you have to write with sincerity. You can’t post blogs to get net traffic and advertisements. If you like to compose poems, you have to do it with passion. You can’t write poems to show off to your girlfriend. CAS will succeed if all agents have suitable ability, exercise their ability properly, create appropriate interactions, and pursue their ideals with determination, enthusiasm, and passion.
Another question is whether the powerful and ordered emergence is indeed the victory of the DC. What if it is the CC who wins and it will become even more powerful, more brutal, and last longer? The answer to this question will be given later; but simply stated, the CC can never win because it does not have the righteous cause and it cannot provide global stability to the system.
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