Historical frauds by Hồ Chí Minh and the Vietnamese Communist Party - Dân Làm Báo

Bài Mới


Historical frauds by Hồ Chí Minh and the Vietnamese Communist Party

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ABSTRACT: Hồ Chí Minh and the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) committed many historical frauds to deceive the Vietnamese people. Since Hồ’s death, the VCP has continued the fraudulent practice with outrageous lies and deceits to cover up immoral and criminal acts or to embellish its image for brainwashing and indoctrination purposes. This article exposes sixteen fraudulent acts committed by Hồ and/or the VCP in their efforts to falsify history for their own benefits from 1930 to 2014. These historical frauds have devastating effects on the Vietnamese people, especially the young children.


"A nation which does not know what it was yesterday, does not know what it is today." Woodrow Wilson (1856 - 1924), 28th President of the United States.


Fraud was Hồ Chí Minh’s basic nature and has been the motto of the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP) for decades (Cao-Đắc 2014c). In ruling Vietnam, Hồ and the VCP have used all sorts of tricks, supported by violence, to force the people to follow their foreign path. One of their most ruthless and cowardly fraudulent practices is the practice of historical frauds. 

While these historical frauds do not directly affect the physical aspects of the victims in short term, their destructive power is far-reaching and impacts the entire population for many generations. When these historical frauds are designed, implemented, promoted, encouraged, and protected by a government, they amount to a serious crime. Hồ and the VCP are the criminals who perpetrated this crime, supported by violence and brutality. 

This crime is more ruthless than killing people in cold blood, because it controls the will of the victims and turns it into a blind faith so that the perpertators can exploit the victims’ production capabilities for their own benefits. It kills many generations slowly and the victims usually don’t know they are being silently tortured and will die slow deaths. It destroys the minds of the people, weakens their ability to reason, and turns them into obedient workers serving the rulers. Soon, blind faith will become slavery. The victims may physically exist but their souls and minds belong to the rulers. The final effect of this process is calamitous: the once indomitable Vietnamese people will be eradicated.

This crime is cowardly because the majority of victims are innocent children, young people, gentle and decent people, or people who have no physical or mental means of self-defense. Being the only force in power, the VCP mentally rapes the children by brainwashing and indoctrination techniques in schools and social activities. It employs its security forces to silence, with violence and brutality, those who protest. Dissidents are jailed. Information flows are forbidden. Freedom of speech is restricted. 

In the 21st century, the existence of these historical frauds and the accompanying brutality is a human tragedy of the highest order. While some victims have been able to escape the mental damages inflicted upon them, the majority of the people, especially the young generation, are still locked up in the mental prison of historical frauds. Exposing these frauds is therefore a necessary step to restore the righteousness of the Vietnamese people. What follows exposes sixteen significant historical frauds committed by Hồ Chí Minh and the VCP from 1930 to 2014. These frauds have the typical characteristics of the communists: brutal, cowardly, evil, stupid, foolish, and arrogant.


There are thousands of historical frauds committed by Hồ and the VCP. It would take a volume thousands or tens of thousands of pages thick to list all the incredible frauds, lies, and deceits committed by the VCP and its predecessors. In addition to historical frauds, Hồ and the VCP also committed many other types of fraud: political, social, economic, diplomatic, and cultural. One particular type of fraud is the worship of Hồ Chí Minh. In this article, the worship of Hồ will not be presented simply because it will take a very thick book to discuss it. 

The following sixteen historical frauds represent the communist pattern of frauds, lies, and deceits. While all of these frauds have been known with various degrees of breadth and depth by Western scholars and historians, not all of them are known by the Vietnamese people living in Vietnam. The government of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) has imposed strict rules forbidding access to anti-communist documents, news, and information in the free world for years. In addition, it has a virtually unlimited budget to cover propaganda expenses, including the production of a countless number of books and documents that contain the historical frauds, and the employment of a huge staff of propagandists, analysts, commentators, and scholars whose main job is to implement and protect these historical frauds.

Many of these frauds are introduced in textbooks in schools or presented in government documents that are distributed or available to the public. The children study these fraudulent historical events or stories in the mistaken belief that they are true. Even many adults, having gone through the same school system, have this mistaken belief. 

The historical frauds include acts that have historical significance and can be classified into the following categories: (1) acts that were originally fraudulent or deceptive; (2) acts that cover up or conceal immoral acts done by the communists; (3) acts that distort the truth of historical facts to embellish the communist image or to denigrate present or past opposing forces (e.g., the former RVN regime) for brainwashing and indoctrination purposes; (4) acts that ignore, downplay, or minimize effects of historical facts that are considered damaging to the communists.

1. The Soviet Nghệ Tĩnh (1930-1931) was initially a peasant revolt, having no participation, let alone leadership, from the communist Party.

One of the earliest frauds committed by the VCP was the so-called Soviet Nghệ Tĩnh. According to the VCP, “[r]ight after its formation, the Party led the people in the entire country to rise up for the [revolutionary] struggle, reaching its peak with the Soviet Nghệ Tĩnh movement in 1930-1931” (ĐCSVN 2012). The VCP claims that “[t]he initial Vietnamese Soviets in our Party history was the obvious development at the height of the revolutionary struggle of the workers and peasants in the entire country in 1930-1931” (ĐCSVN 1976, 205). 

In reality, the Nghệ Tĩnh uprising was initially a peasant revolt, having no participation, let alone leadership, from the Indochinese Communist Party (ICP), predecessor of the VCP. It also didn’t have anything resembling the local “soviet” governments. 

The major cause of the movement “had been peasant dis-satisfaction with economic conditions” (Duiker 1973, 192). In particular, in Nghệ An, “the tenth-month rice harvest of 1929 and the fifth-month harvest of 1930 were both bad” (Bernal 1981, 157). The VCP (or the ICP at the time) might have reluctantly participated only after the revolt became widespread because “[t]he party was organizationally and theoretically unprepared in 1930 for a major confrontation with French power and . . . the leadership was well aware that an uprising would be premature” (Duiker 1973, 197). The Party therefore was “forced into the position of supporting a revolt that it did not really want” (ibid.). 

The peasants didn’t even know what the hammer and sickle red flag stood for. Many thought that this flag was the government flag (ibid., 190). “[E]vidence seems to show that the [ICP] leadership did not initiate the Soviets, nor did it approve them when they appeared, but that once the movement was underway they had to be supported to the end” (ibid., 198). “There is no record of any special directive being sent to Annam, let alone to Nghe-Tinh” (Bernal 1981, 159). “[T]here is absolutely no indication that the leaders felt that the time was right” (ibid.). The communist participation in the uprising, therefore, was merely a response to a fait accompli (Duiker 1973, 197). 

In addition to the Party’s unpreparedness for the uprising, there is another compelling reason why the VCP would not want to lead such a “revolutionary” movement. During the time of the revolt, the VCP was renamed the ICP in October 1930 at the insistence of the Comintern (Duiker 2000, 187). “[T]he published document of the conference [gave] surprisingly little attention to the events taking place in Nghe-Tinh” (Duiker 1973, 193). But the ICP criticized the executive committee for advocating the mass action and remarked that the alliance between workers and peasants in the region was not uniformly high (Duiker 2000, 188). This is clearly consistent with the Comintern’s critique in 1929 that the central role of the working class in the Vietnamese revolution was not sufficiently emphasized (ibid., 186).

The VCP tried to draw the connection between the workers and the peasants in the movement, but in reality, the Nghệ Tĩnh revolt was essentially a peasant movement. Population statistics show that the intellectuals, peasants, and petty bourgeois comprised 73% of the communist members in Nghệ Tĩnh in December 1930 (Bernal 1981, 164), hardly a percentage that would be looked upon favorably by the Comintern. The ICP admitted this problem and gave the instruction that “because not yet realizing the Party direction in the class struggle in the villages and having made rightist mistakes, the red peasant associations recruited rich peasants, even allowing rich peasants joining the executive committee” (ĐCSVN 1976, 239). 

The reason why many communist members were arrested or killed during this period is that “[m]any French in Indochina, who for years had been accustomed to putting a Bolshevik label on all forms of nationalism in Vietnam, were quick to see communist leadership in the strike movement” (Duiker 1973, 190). In addition, a committee member, Ngô Đức Trí, “was seized by the French . . . and not only confessed party secrets, but also gave away the locations of the other members of the Central Committee” (ibid., 194; Dommen 2002, 44). In other words, communist members were arrested and killed during the uprising not because they led the revolt, but because the French strongly believed that the revolt had been organized by them and therefore went after them. 

So, how was the label “Soviet” used to designate this peasant revolt? It was because Hồ (Nguyễn Ái Quốc at the time) hastily reported to the Comintern in November 1930, “At present in some red villages, peasant Soviets have been established” (quoted in Nguyễn 2001, 75). In reality, no such local Soviet governments in the Nghệ Tĩnh villages existed. There were newly formed peasant associations that assumed power, “usually calling themselves xa bo nong (village peasant sections) a name that remained current throughout the movement” (Bernal 1981, 152). However, the leaders of the Communist Party “immediately started referring to them as ‘soviets’” (ibid.). Party Vietnamese historians admitted that “no comrades at that time received any directives or heard anything about the establishment of Soviet governments [in these villages]” (quoted in Nguyễn 2001, 75). So, why did Hồ call the peasant revolt a Soviet movement? There are two possibilities: (1) Hồ wanted to please his superiors in the Comintern, and (2) the Comintern hinted to Hồ their desire to motivate communists in other countries to follow the example set by the Vietnamese communists (Nguyễn 2001, 76). 

Regardless of what prompted Hồ to call the revolt Soviet, the label Soviet and the characterization of the peasant revolts as the early Party revolutionary movement are pure fiction. The VCP simply claimed credit for the peasant revolts, “mainly in the form of articles by the skilled propagandist Tran Huy Lieu” (Dommen 2002, 44).

In reality, the so-called Soviet Nghệ Tĩnh was sparked by a nationalist movement started by the Yên Bái uprising (McLane 1966, 147-157, referring the Yên Bái uprising as the “Enbay” mutiny). The Yên Bái uprising and subsequent revolts by the Vietnam Nationalist Party (Việt Nam Quốc Dân Đảng, or VNQDĐ) were quelled quickly by the French. Many members of the VNQDĐ, including its famous leader Nguyễn Thái Học, were captured, tried, and executed. The nationalist revolutionary activities were applauded by the Soviet communists (ibid., 148-149). The momentum of the Yên Bái uprising spread to other parts of Vietnam and led to several strikes in Saigon and other cities and the peasant revolts in northern part of Central Vietnam, notably the Nghệ Tĩnh region (ibid., 149-150). 

The Soviet Nghệ Tĩnh is a serious fraud because not only the Vietnamese communists claimed credit for something that they didn’t deserve, but they also ignored the significant contribution and sacrifice of the Nghệ Tĩnh peasants and the VNQDĐ.

2. Việt Minh (1941) was a trap to entice nationalists to follow communism

Another major fraud was the formation of the Vietminh, founded by Hồ and his comrades in May 1941 at Pắc Bó under the auspices of the ICP. Hồ, a Comintern agent, and his communist comrades formed the core of Vietminh leaders, but they hid their communist association. 

Even the name of Việt Minh (abbreviated for Việt Nam Độc Lập Đồng Minh) carried a fraudulent image. Hồ took this name from a similar name of the organization formed by the non-communist nationalist Hồ Học Lãm in Nanjing in the late 1930s (Duiker 1996, 71; Marr 1997, 165, 250). Borrowing the name of a nationalist organization to be used for a newly formed communist organization is a despicable fraud. The objective is obvious: to mislead people into believing that Vietminh was a nationalist organization. 

To be consistent with this new name, Hồ and his comrades hid their communist association and asserted that “the demands of ideology and class war must be subordinated to those of the anti-imperialist struggle for national independence” (Duiker 1996, 71). With this new strategy, Hồ and his comrades welcomed all pariotic elements into the front against the common adversary (ibid., 71-72) “Not only the bourgeoisie and rich peasants, but wealthy landlords, Overseas Chinese merchants, and patriotic Frenchmen were considered potential allies” (Duiker 1996, 72). To prevent dangers caused by the admission of such diverse groups, Hồ let the Party to control power in the front organization. However, Hồ “made a great effort to disguise the Party’s role [] in order to maximize the front’s appeal to moderates” (sđd.).

The Vietnamese nationalist leaders were “wise enough to recognize the Vietminh as a Communist trap” (Buttinger 1967, 265) and refused to join. However, the “Vietminh was not designed to attract the nationalist leaders but their followers . . . to maneuver them politically until they were forced to cooperate with the Communist Party” (ibid., 266). The fraudulent nature of the Vietminh has engendered “the belief that in order to be politically successful, it is necessary to be not only as ruthless, but also as deceitful and immoral as the Communists have apparently always been” (ibid.).

3. The so-called August Revolution (1945) was merely a result of several unexpected events mainly caused by the sudden “power vacuum” after the Japanese surrender to the Allies.

The government of the SRV calls the August Revolution “a victory of the active role in preparing the forces, of the arts of creating the opportunity, grabbing the opportunity and acting resolutely” (Chinhphu 2014). It declares that “the success of the August Revolution was not about taking advantage of the ‘power vacuum’ as viewed by a number of foreign scholars,” but was about preparing till the opportunity arrived when the fascist Japanese surrendered to the Allies and the French was weakened (ibid.).

Regardless of the communist rhetorics, historical facts don’t lie. The facts show that the communist successful seizure of power was due to “a number of fortuitous circumstances” (Duiker 1996, 104), including: (1) “the delayed arrival of Allied occupation forces after the surrender of Japan [that] created a political vacuum at the levers of power” (Duiker 1996, 104); (2) the overall confusion regarding the future of Vietnam during the period around the time the Japanese surrender (Vu 1986, 312); (3) the efforts by the Trần Trọng Kim’s government to gain total independence and territorial unification from Japan (ibid., 313); (4) the Great Famine of Ất Dậu that “provided the sense of desperation that gave the Communists access to the villages and fueled the rural insurgency” (Duiker 1996, 104-105); (5) the Vietminh’s shrewd tactic of claiming to have support of the Allies; (6) the “factional and regional divisions” among the various nationalist parties (Duiker 2000, 105); and (7) the Japanese coup overthrowing the French in March 1945 and eliminating the French military presence in Vietnam until 1946.

At the time, the United States wanted to establish a network in Indochina to fight against Japan and to abolish the French colonial system (Lacouture 1968, 267-268). The American employment of Hồ as an agent to provide intelligence information on the Japanese is well documented (See, for example, Bartholomew-Feis 2006, 166, 209). The American assistance to Hồ’s Vietminh was by no means substantial from a military standpoint, but it provided Hồ with a powerful psychological weapon to win the faith and confidence of the Vietnamese people. 

Hồ exploited this psychological weapon to the fullest extent including using cheap tricks. In 1945, at a meeting with U.S. Maj. General Claire Chennault, Hồ asked for an autographed photo from the General (Bartholomew-Feis 2006, 157-158; Logevall 2012, 84), so that he could use it as evidence of American support, waving it “like a magic wand on his travels throughout the region” (Logevall 2012, 84). During August 1945, “Ho’s autographed picture of General Chennault was prominently displayed” (Jamieson 1995, 193). As a side note, his trick of using pictures autographed by people in power to impress others was not always uccessful. In 1950, he asked Stalin to sign a portrait (or a magazine), but Stalin, an evil communist master, appeared to know Hồ’s trick and had the signed photograph or magazine taken back (Brocheux 2007, 145; Duiker 2000, 421). Nevertheless, without the claim of American help, the Vietminh’s seizure of the government would not have emerged so quickly and strongly (Lacouture 1968, 269).

In addition, the government of Trần Trọng Kim, formed on April 17, 1945, actually paved the way for a power take-over after the Japanese surrender. In fact, “Ho was the principal beneficiary of Kim’s achievements” (Vu 1986, 316). Prior to August 17 and before surrendering, the Japanese decided to give total independence and territorial unification to Vietnam. The record shows that “Kim obtained territorial unification of the country just prior to Japan’s unexpected surrender, and, more importantly, that various preparatory steps had been taken in Thuan-hoa and Nam Bo to carry out such unification” (ibid., 314). It should be noted that it was Kim who refused proposals by several Japanese commanders to use Japanese troops to crush the Viet Minh (ibid., 315). 

“The undeniable contribution of Kim’s government” to the so-called August Revolution, ironically, was its encouragement of mass political participation “including street demonstrations, meetings, and marches that propagated a spirit of cultural and political independence” (ibid., 313). More importantly, “a generation of Vietnamese youth was mobilized under the auspices of both Kim’s government and the Japanese authorities” (ibid.). “Kim’s youth projects provided the Viet Minh with tens of thousands of youngsters who were to serve the ICP’s flag in the name of national independence and unity rather than in the name of Marxism-Leninism” (ibid.). 

The actual events that took place didn’t resemble a revolution at all. On August 17, 1945, in Hanoi, Vietminh cadres disturbed a mass demonstration organized by the General Association of Civil Servants, originally aimed at celebrating independence and territorial unification and supporting Kim’s government, and successfully took control of it (Vu 1986, 313; Duiker 2000, 310-311; Marr 1996, 382-387). “Unrestricted by Japanese police, crowds circulated through the streets, waving banners and shouting slogans,” but few “had a clear idea of the nature of the Vietminh movement, which now claimed to represent the interests of all the Vietnamese people” (Duiker 2000, 312).

4. Hồ’s declaration of independence (1945) deceived the Vietnamese people because Hồ had planned to sell out Vietnam to France two months earlier.

On September 2, 1945, Hồ Chí Minh read a speech to declare independence, borrowing words from the U.S. Declaration of Independence and the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen from the French Revolution. He denounced harshly “the brutal and undemocratic character of the French colonial regime” (Duiker 1996, 104).

In reality, Hồ had actually been ready to sell out Vietnam even when the French were an impotent force in Vietnam. In July 1945, he “proposed temporary reestablishment of French rule until Vietnam’s independence was assured . . . for a period of five to ten years” (Huyen 1971, 72-73; Sainteny 1972, 43, fn **). This proposal even when the French were still under Japanese control, clearly shows that Hồ’s declaration of independence was merely Hồ’s trick to win the hearts of the Vietnamese people. It should be noted that Hồ’s declaration of independence was just like that, a declaration, no more no less. It does not mean Vietnam’s independence was assured. Hồ understood it very well, as his dealings with the Chinese and the French subsequently revealed. His July 1945 proposal, therefore, was still fresh on his mind when he read his speech on September 2.

In addition, together with Hồ Chí Minh, Võ Nguyên Giáp deceived the Vietnamese people by claiming to have support of the Allies. Giáp, immediately after Hồ's speech, delivered his own speech, declaring, "The United States of America . . . has paid the greatest contributions to the Vietnamese fight against fascist Japan, our enemy, and so the great American Republic is a good friend of ours" (See, for example, Cao-Đắc 2014b, for a list of references). Calling the U.S. insignificant assistance “the greatest [contribution] to the Vietnamese fight against fascist Japan” is a blatant lie. 

5. "The Gold Week" (1945) was a disguise for taking gold and money from the people to bribe the Chinese and General Lu Han 

On August 28, 1945, four Kuomingtan armies “totaling 180,000 men under the command of General Lu Han, crossed the Tonkinese frontier” (Huyen 1971, 97) in their mission to disarm the Japanese. On September 14, 1945, the Kuomingtan Chinese army entered North Vietnam (Willbanks 2009, 8). Hồ and his comrades, especially Võ Nguyên Giáp, were worried that the Chinese troops posed a serious threat to the Communists because their commanders “had developed a friendly relationship with the ICP’s rivals, the Dong Minh Hoi and the VNQDD” (Duiker 1996, 115; Marr 1996, 499).

Hồ and his comrades organized the Gold Week (“Tuần lễ vàng”) during September 16-22, 1945, “appealing to the people to turn in gold and other valuables so that the government might purchase arms from the Chinese” (Willbanks 2009, 8). The “Gold Week” brought in “400 kilograms or 800 pounds of gold and 20 million [Indochinese] piasters” (Huyen 1971, 100). The total value of gold and cash from the “Gold Week” was about $33 million U.S. dollars in 2014. Not much, but it was a fortune for the poor people in North Vietnam in 1945. 

What was the collected gold and money used for? According to the communist account, “the money was used to help the government to solve the financial problems at the time, buying arms to build up the defense force” (QĐND 2010). In reality, “the bulk of [the collected donation] was used to bribe the Chinese occupants” (Huyen 1971, 100; Willbanks 2009, 8). In particular, upon “Lu Han’s arrival in Hanoi, Ho had welcomed him with a magnificent gift, a solid gold opium smoking set” (Huyen 1971, 100; also Buttinger 1967, 634 n79; Harrison 1989, 107). 

Hồ’s bribery of the Chinese helped reducing the tension between the communists and the occupying Chinese. It also facilitated his dealings with the various Vietnamese nationalist parties. 

6. The dissolution of the Indochinese Communist Party (1945) was designed to placate the occupying Kuomingtang army and various Vietnamese nationalist parties 

Under pressure from the nationalists who found support from the Kuomingtang Chinese, Hồ dissolved the ICP in 1945. The dissolution was to remove the name “communist” from Hồ’s association to avoid the appearance of communist affiliation. 

In reality, “the dissolution of the ICP was just another Ho trick” (Huyen 1971, 103). The Party continued its work under the name Marxist Research Association (Hội nghiên cứu chủ nghĩa Marx) (Duiker 2000, 349-350). The Party was formally refounded with a new name, Vietnamese Workers’ Party (VWP - Đảng Lao động Việt Nam) in 1951 after Hồ firmly secured the backing of communist China and the Soviet Union. 

The dissolution of the ICP in 1945 was a desperate fraudulent act to “reassure the Chinese command of the nationalist nature of the Vietminh government and to make it more appealing to non-Communist Vietnamese” (Huyen 1971, 103). It was also used to appeal to the United States for assistance. The dissolution of the ICP “did serve to lubricate the peace talks” (Duiker 2000, 350). General Xiao Wen organized a meeting between representatives of the communist Party and members of the nationalist parties. “The parties agreed in principle on the formation of a broad coalition government composed of members of several parties” (Duiker 2000, 350).

The concerted effort of Hồ and the VCP in hiding their true communist association while Hồ was the leader of the so-called revolutionary movement clearly indicates their deceptive nature.

7. The Sainteny agreement (1946) helped legitimizing the communist government and used the French to help in eliminating the nationalists 

The agreement signed between Hồ and Jean Sainteny on March 6, 1946, to allow French troops to return to North Vietnam was a double fraud. On the surface, it looked like Hồ conceded to the French by allowing them to bring 25,000 troops into North Vietnam in exchange for French recognition of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) as a free state within the Indochinese Federation and the French Union (Huyen 1971, 123, 131; Logevall 2012, 133). 

In reality, it was a fraudulent act designed by Hồ and his Party, operating as the Marxist Research Association, to achieve two main objectives: (i) to gain recognition as the only legitimate Vietnamese political force in Vietnam (Logevall 2012, 135), and (ii) to use French military strength in eliminating rival nationalist parties. 

Hồ and his Party knew that their usurpation of power in August 1945 was illegitimate because it had no real support from the people. The general elections on January 6, 1946 were rigged with so many irregularities (Huyen 1971, 107-110) that Hồ and his Party had to find ways to claim their validity. The Hồ-Sainteny agreement would give the world and the people of Vietnam a feeling that not only Hồ’s government was legitimate, but that it was also the only political force that represented Vietnam. In addition, the nationalists had become increasingly threatening, especially with the support of the occupying Chinese. While pretending to concede 70 seats to the nationalists in the national assembly, Hồ and his Party were secretly prepared to eliminate their forces. The French would be thrilled to offer a hand in this eradication process because they would also quell an opposing force. 

To give the appearance that he was reluctant to sign the Sainteny agreement, Hồ said that he would rather sniff French shit for a while than eat Chinese excrements for the rest of his life (Logevall 2012, 133). In reality, he had known the French would return to North Vietnam with or without his agreement with Sainteny and the Chinese would leave North Vietnam soon. He had been aware of the Sino-French negotiations in Chungking, which resulted in a treaty on February 28, 1946 (Huyen 1971, 111). Under this Sino-French treaty, in exchange for numerous concessions from the French, the Chinese agreed to withdraw their armies from Indochina within the month of March, 1946 (Huyen 1971, 111). In fact, a force of some 21,000 men from the French Ninth Division of Colonial Infantry and Second Armored Division had already been dispatched on warships from Saigon to Tonkin in late February 1946 (Logevall 2012, 132). The Sainteny agreement, therefore, merely assured the French that the Vietnamese force would not engage in hostile activities with the French. 

With French military help, the Vietminh under command of Võ Nguyên Giáp systematically killed thousands of nationalists in 1946 (Huyen 1971, 163). The massacre of the nationalists and future nationalist leaders is well documented (See, for example, Cao-Đắc 2014b). When the war broke out between the French and the Vietminh in December 1946, “it was no accident that Ho became the leader of the only significant resistance” because “[h]e had killed almost all the others” (Nixon 1985, 35).

8. The Điện Biên Phủ victory (1954) was achieved thanks to the Chinese assistance and the contribution of the Vietnamese peasants who were promised land ownership,

The battle of Điện Biên Phủ (1954) has been hailed by the communist government as an earth shattering victory. According to the communist government, the victory is “recored in the history of the Vietnamese people like a Bạch Đằng, a Chi Lăng or a Đống Đa victory in the 20th century” (Chính phủ CHXHCNVN). This statement is a blatant distortion of historical facts. Equating the Điện Biên Phủ battle to the Bạch Đằng, Chi Lăng, and Đống Đa battles is the utmost disrespect for the history of Vietnam and an unforgivable insult to Ngô Quyền, Lê Lợi, and Nguyễn Huệ. The battle of Điện Biên Phủ pales in comparison with these battles in every aspect. 

The battle of Điện Biên Phủ was simply a battle dictated by the communist Chinese at the expense of tens of thousands of lives of the Vietnamese people. The Chinese assistance to the Vietminh in the battle of Điện Biên Phủ has been widely known (See, for example, Cao-Đắc 2014b). 

To mobilize logistical support forces, Hồ’s Party relied on poor peasants with a call for patriotism and promises of land in the land reform campaign (Zhai 2000, 38, 41-42). In the end, the communists mobilized a massive supply force close to 300,000 thanks to the deceptive call for patriotism that forced the intellectual and worker to to cooperate to fight the French (See, for example, Cao-Đắc 2014b for a list of references). With five divisions of 47,500 troops and the enormous military assistance from communist China, supported by the huge supply force, the Vietminh besieged Điện Biên Phủ, defended by a combined force of some 20,000 combat troops, for fifty-five day. Điện Biên Phủ collapsed on May 7, 1954. The Vietminh casualties were estimated at 7,900 dead and 15,000 wounded while the French losses were 2,204 dead, 6,452 wounded and 3,610 missing (Fall 2002, 484, 487).

With such statistics, how dare the VCP compare Điện Biên Phủ with Bạch Đằng, Chi Lăng or Đống Đa? Foreigners who are not familiar with the Bạch Đằng, Chi Lăng or Đống Đa battle may think these historic battles are similar to the Điện Biên Phủ battle in terms of nature of the battle (besieging a fort in 55 days), massive mobilization of soldiers and logistical support forces against a small enemy force (350,000 vs. 20,000), casualties (23,000 vs. 9,000), and heavy foreign assistance. What kind of bonehead thinks of such a way to insult the Vietnamese people and the national heroes Ngô Quyền, Lê Lợi, and Nguyễn Huệ?

The battle of Điện Biên Phủ is also an opportunity for the VCP to deify Võ Nguyên Giáp. In reality, Giáp’s cruelty, disregard of human lives (including his own soldiers), incompetence, and cowardice have been well-known (See, for example, Cao-Đắc 2014b for various sources; Đặng 2013).

On October 13, 2013, Giáp’s funeral was organized with pomp and splendor. Tens of thousands of mourners lined up the highway to the airport where the coffin was to be flown to his home province. Thousands of people publicly cried. Almost a year later, a totally different image emerged. On September 2, 2014, the movie “Living together with history,” “completely funded by state money” at about $21 billion VND (about $1 million U.S. dollars) and with content glorifying the Điện Biên Phủ victory and Võ Nguyên Giáp, was theatrically released in Hà Nội. Only after a few days, the movie showing was stopped because it attracted a mere 2, 3 movie goers each day (Tuổi 2014b). Many wonder why tens of thousands of people took pains in lining up the highway and cried dolorously during Giáp’s funeral but only a few people went to see a movie glorifying him. 

9. The Quỳnh Lưu uprising (1956) was a large-scale revolt that required an entire North Vietnamese army division to suppress it but the VCP downplayed its intensity, distorted its causes, and didn’t mention about the brutal suppression.

In November 1956, peasants from the Quỳnh Lưu district in Nghệ An, predominantly Catholics, started an uprising that lasted for a few days. The peasants protested against “the detention of relatives and confiscation of property allegedly in connection with the land reform program, the denial of the right to move South . . ., and the severe punishment inflicted on those who had tried to move” (Nutt 1970, 3). The problem actually “began to appear in 1955, when villagers protested that they had been prevented by government officials from emigrating to the South” (Duiker 2000, 486-487). The “local people have a reputation for being proud and independent men” (JUSPAO 1966, 1), but the “Party cadres frequently denounced local Catholic leaders as reactionaries and saboteurs” (Duiker 2000, 487). 

In a period of several days, peasants, “some 20,000 in all, armed with swords and farm tools surprised Communist guards, took their weapons and seized several district governmental installations” (JUSPAO 1966). Their protest slogans, remarkably similar to those currently used in Vietnam, included “Down with the country-selling Communists!” and “Let us drive the Chinese Communist troops from North Vietnam!” (Moyar 2006, 63). However, unlike the current situation in Vietnam where security and police forces obediently follow the government instructions, in Quỳnh Lưu “many of the troops, themselves from peasant families, openly or tacitly sided with the rebels” (JUSPAO 1966, 2). Some militia units from the Quỳnh Lưu district “joined the rebels en masse” (ibid.). 

Hanoi immediately sent an entire army division to the area, first the 304th Division, later joined by elements of an artillery battalion and two regiments (JUSPAO 1966, 3). It was also reported that “Giap sent his closest unit, the 325th Division, to suppress the revolt” (Currey 1999, 222). The army troops quickly suppressed the revolt. “Giap’s ruthless units killed or wounded more than a thousand peasants” (Currey 1999, 222). They even “fired indiscriminately on men, women, and children” (Nutt 1970, 3). “At the height of the operation some 20,000 North Vietnamese combat troops were in the field searching out the 2,000 or so insurgents who had fled to the hills” (JUSPAO 1966, 3). “Eventually, most of the insurgents were killed or captured although several hundred of them managed to escape to South Vietnam” (JUSPAO 1966). In addition, the government forces captured and deported over six thousand to work and reeducation camps (Currey 1999, 222).

While the brutal nature of the communists was not totally unexpected, the swift and enormous response was somewhat surprising. It turned out that the reason for the quick and brutal suppression was to show the Chinese that everything was under control. “On 18 November, a Chinese delegation led by Zhou Enlai arrived in Hanoi” (Ang 1997, 42). Although Zhou’s visit to Hanoi was not well advertised, it “was known about in advance” (ibid.). The government of the DRV, in its eagerness to please its Chinese master, didn’t want to worry Zhou with some peasants uprising.

For obvious reasons, the VCP downplayed the intensity of the uprising. One communist article reported that the uprising was a scheme orchestrated by the Americans and the South Vietnam government. “Mỹ-Diệm directed reactionaries who, in the name of religion, took advantage of the freedom of religion to distort our policy of the error correction in the land reform and provoke the Catholic population, causing violent revolt in Quỳnh Lưu” (Lê 2004). There were no reports of the killings of the peasants and the deportation of thousands of captured insurgents to work and reeducation camps.

The Quỳnh Lưu uprising in 1956 is similar to the Nghệ Tĩnh revolt in 1930 in many aspects: the geographical location (Nghệ An), the insurgents (peasants), the intensity, the violence, and the brutal suppression. Yet, in the communist world, the Quỳnh Lưu uprising has been forgotten while the Nghệ Tĩnh revolt has been claimed with glory as due to the VCP’s brilliant leadership.

10. Phạm Văn Đồng’s official letter to China (1958) revealed either the VCP’s traitorous character or its deceptive practice to its own ally.

The incident involving Phạm Văn Đồng’s official letter to China to agree to the Chinese declaration about the territorial sea is widely known. The legal validity of Đồng’s letter is still in dispute, but the legal validity of that letter is not at issue here. 

The island disputes can be interpreted in two different ways, according to Hồ and his comrades’s belief in the possession status of the islands at the time. If they believed the islands belonged to the DRV at the time, then Đồng’s letter was clear evidence of their traitorous act of secretly selling part of their country’s territory to a foreign country in exchange for “good friendship” between the two countries. If they didn’t believe the islands belonged to the DRV at the time and belonged to the Republic of Vietnam (RVN) instead, then Đồng’s letter was clear evidence of their deceptive practices to others, even to their closest friend. In either case, Hồ and his comrades acted immorally and violated the basic elements of trust and honesty in dealing with their own people or with other countries in international affairs. 

The government of the SRV may or may not prevail legally in the islands dispute, but they cannot be victorious morally.

11. The National Liberation Front in the South (1960) was a device created by the VCP but the VCP denied this until after they occupied the South in 1975 

In 1960, the communists in the North founded and controlled the National Liberation Front (NLF) and its Provisionary Revolutionary Government (PRG) but had denied their association with the NLF for years (Joes 2001, 49). Only after North Vietnam conquered South Vietnam did they openly admit that “[t]he Provisionary Revolutionary Government was always simply a group emanating from the DRV” (quoted in Truong 1986, 268).

Perhaps one of the worst frauds committed by the VCP was their about-face with their own people, the NFL and the PRG. “After the 1975 victory, the Front and the PRG not only had no further role to play; they became a positive obstacle to the rapid consolidation of power” (Truong 1986, 268). In the words of the former minister of justice of the PRG, “with total power in their hands, they began to show their cards in the most brutal fashion” (ibid.).

12. The Vietnam War (1954 – 1975) was waged by Hồ and the VCP by deceiving the people in the North and creating division and hatred among the Vietnamese people.

The worst fraud, and the violence that was used to cover up the fraud and/or to advance communist objectives, committed by Hồ and the VCP, is their evil scheme in waging war against South Vietnam and the United States. The scheme is evil because it took advantage of the compassionate fraternal love of the Vietnamese people and turned it into a deep hatred toward the imaginary imperialist and the puppet government in the name of patriotism. The result is the waste of millions of lives. 

Hồ and the VCP implemented their fraud by blatant lies and deceits. To the people in North Vietnam, they painted the picture of South Vietnam as a country oppressed by a wicked government who employed a huge army subservient to the imperialist Americans. Many Northerners believed South Vietnam was a poor country whose population was robbed by the South Vietnamese soldiers and they had the noble duty to liberate their brethren from oppression and end their suffering (Herrington 1982, 192). “Hanoi’s leaders had done an impressive job of selling the North Vietnamese population on the sacred mission of saving their southern brethren from the clutches of imperialism” (ibid., 264). 

Dương Thu Hương, a writer and a political dissident, was shocked at the communist deceptions when she witnessed the conditions in South Vietnam compared to the North in 1975. She said, “After coming to the South, I realize that the regime in the North is a barbarous regime because it blinds the people and covers their ears” (Đinh 2012).

13. The Lê Văn Tám (1945) and Nguyễn Văn Bé (1967) incidents show the stupid mentality of the communists in fabricating heroic images to serve their obectives.

The stories of Lê Văn Tám and Nguyễn Văn Bé are well known (See, for example, Nguyên 2013; Southerland 1971; Phan 2009). The communists considered them heroes who sacrificed their lives in the wars against the French and the Americans, and elevated them to martyrdom. The problem is there are fictitious elements in their stories. Lê Văn Tám was a fabricated character with an imaginary heroic act based on an actual incident and Nguyễn Văn Bé was a real person with a fictitious story. The Vietnamese communists lied and made up stories about them. No real people died and no heroic acts were carried out.

Despite the undisputed evidence of the lies, the government of the SRV still retains their heroic images. Lê Văn Tám’s story has been told in academic books in elementary schools. Several schools, scholarship funds, monuments, parks, streets, and many geographical locations across Vietnam are named after him. Some streets named Nguyễn Văn Bé were changed after 1975, but there are still several schools named Nguyễn Văn Bé. 

The communist mentality is incomprehensible. By keeping names of fabricated heroes for schools, streets, and parks, the government of the SRV encourages the practice of frauds, lies, and deceits. They hint to the people that stories about other communist heroes or martyrs may also be fabricated. On one hand, this stupidity is actually good because it is true that many stories of communist heroes are fabricated. On the other hand, its damage is catastrophic because real heroes in history may suffer the same bad assumption. The clear message it wants to send to the children is, “It’s OK to lie, as long as it serves the objectives of the revolution and glorifies the heroic spirit of the Vietnamese people.” No wonder Vietnamese students hate studying history. To them, Hai Bà Trưng, Ngô Quyền, Lê Lợi, Trần Hưng Đạo, Nguyễn Huệ and many other national heroes might just be fabricated characters, just like Lê Văn Tám; or they might be real people but their heroic acts are fictitious, just like those of Nguyễn Văn Bé.

14. The UNESCO incident (1989) not only deceived the Vietnamese people but also brought national shame to Vietnam when Hồ Chí Minh was judged inferior to a Thai scholar.

In 1987, the government of the SRV informed UNESCO that Vietnam would celebrate Hồ’s 100th birthday on May 19, 1990, and mentioned that Hồ was a brilliant man of culture from Vietnam (Bùi 2006, 82). UNESCO merely passed a resolution to recommend member states join in the commemoration of the centenary of Hồ’s birth, noting that “the year 1990 will mark the centenary of the birth of President Ho Chi Minh, Vietnamese hero of national liberation and great man of culture” (Bùi 2006, 81-83; UNESCO 1987, 134-135). 

By unambiguously using the adjective “Vietnamese” at the beginning of the phrase to qualify the entire phrase, UNESCO simply repeated what the government of the SRV requested that Hồ Chí Minh was a Vietnamese hero of national liberation and a Vietnamese great man of culture. Of course he was a hero and great man to the communists of communist Vietnam, the same way as Hitler was a hero and great man to the Nazis of Nazi Germany, Kim Jong Il to North Koreans of North Korea, Mao Zedong to the communist Chinese of China, and Stalin to Soviet communists of the U.S.S.R during their lifetime. 

Despite this clear designation, the Vietnamese communist officials, whether due to ignorance, stupidity, or intentional misconstruction, interpreted UNESCO’s phrase as “Vietnamese hero of national liberation and world/international great man of culture.” (Emphasis added.) The designation of Hồ as one of the “world’s great men of culture” is included in textbooks used in schools in Vietnam. ("Hồ Chí Minh is also a world cultural great man, a great poet - Hồ Chí Minh còn là một Danh nhân văn hoá thế giới, một nhà thơ lớn") (BGDĐT 2011a, 141). The claim that Hồ is a “world-renowned man of culture” is announced in government media (Chinhphu 2010; Trương 2014). 

UNESCO clearly refused to recognize Hồ as an international great man of culture. Instead, UNESCO recognized a Thai citizen as a world literary scholar in the same meeting and included this statement in the same section. This is a concrete proof that Hồ, a head of state, was judged inferior to a Thai citizen.

In the entire sub-section (sub-section 18.65) in the resolution, UNESCO merely used words such as “national,” and “Vietnamese” to describe Hồ. In addition, UNESCO carefully worded the actions to be “noting,” and “considering.” In contrast, in the subsection devoted to the centenary of the birth of Phya Anuman Rajadhon, a Thai scholar, UNESCO states “Recognizing that Phya Anuman Rajadhon was a great scholar whose contributions to the literary world will always be remembered and appreciated, and was the light that guided his contemporaries and succeeding generations towards truth, goodness and beauty” (UNESCO 1987, 133. Emphasis in original.) 

The use of the words “recognizing” and “literary world” in describing Phya Anuman Rajadhon is clearly a marked contrast to the words “noting,” “considering” and “national” that describe Hồ. Since UNESCO used “recognizing” and “literary world” for Phya Anuman Rajadhon but not for Hồ Chí Minh in the same section in the same meeting, it is clear that UNESCO refused to “recognize” Hồ for his contribution in the fields of culture, education, and the arts, even in Vietnam, let alone considering Hồ for that stature at the world/international level. Certainly, recognizing Hồ for his contribution to the cultural world is an impossibility. 

It is mind-boggling that the government of the SRV couldn’t understand these simple differences. Considering the fact that Phya Anuman Rajadhon was merely a Thai scholar and Hồ Chí Minh was a Vietnamese head of state, this incident should be considered a national disgrace. Instead, the government of the SRV distorts UNESCO statement, takes pride in it and spreads it all over the country. While the world, and especially Thailand, is laughing at Vietnam, the Vietnamese people brag about Hồ being a “world-renowned man of culture.” In addition to using an unworthy person to represent the culture of Vietnam, the government of the SRV worsens the situation by distorting the truth to deceive the people.

Is there any more serious shame that the government of the SRV could bring to the people of Vietnam? 

15. The television series "Mậu Thân 1968" (2013) by director Lê Phong Lan is a desperate effort to erase the unspeakable crime of the communists.

On January 25, 2013, the Vietnam television station VTV1 started broadcasting the 12-part series "Mặu Thân 1968" made by director Lê Phong Lan (Lê 2013). According to Lê Phong Lan, she had traveled back and forth between Vietnam and the U.S. for 10 years and "had met and interviewed about 200 witnesses" from all sides (communist, American, and Republic of Vietnam) to seek the truth (Lê 2013). Sadly, the truth she was looking for, in reality, is merely a desperate effort in erasing the unspeakable crime of the communists. Amusingly, the series "Mặu Thân 1968" appears to show that it was about time for the communists to bring the “truth” to light after 45 years of silence. Who could ever believe the communists had been willing to be silent for 45 years when they thought they were “falsely accused”? Propagandizing is a skill they have always been proud of and they had been in silence for 45 years?

Blatantly, part 8, titled “The dramatic song,” denies that the Huế massacre was caused by the Vietnamese Communists, and instead blames it to the American bombing and the RVN army. In a clip, Lê Phong Lan interviews Nguyển Đắc Xuân who says that the massacre was due to the psychological attack by the RVN.The clip quotes words of American scholars Noam Chomsky, Edward S. Herman, and D. Gareth Porter who express that the bodies buried in mass graves were due to the American bombings and the RVN retaliation against the communist sympathizers when they retook Huế, and some of these bodies belonged to the communist soldiers who died in the battle. This line of defense has no merit. Everybody knows Nguyễn Đắc Xuân was one of the murderers who killed the citizens of Huế. Other murderers included Hoàng Phủ Ngọc Tường, Hoàng Phủ Ngọc Phan, and Nguyễn Thị Đoan Trinh. The one-sided interviewing of an alleged murderer about the murder he allegedly committed is a repugnant act in a historical documentary. Quoting only from the anti-war scholars about the war is quite a stupid effort of those who want to re-write history.

Therefore, it’s not surprising when the series "Mậu Thân 1968" never mentions the most important witness and document about the Mậu Thân massacre: Dr. Alje Vennema and his book, titled “The Vietcong Massacre at Huế” and published in 1976 (Vennema 1976). Dr. Alje Vennema, a sympathizer of the anti-war movement, was the most reliable witness of the Mậu Thân massacre because he himself participated in locating the gravesites and examined the victims’ remains to determine the causes of death with the precision of a medical doctor. Even D. Gareth Porter, the anti-war Ameican historian who defended the communists, admitted that Dr. Vennema was a witness. Porter, however, used reports opposite to Dr. Vennema’s reports. 

In his book, Dr. Vennema described in great details the gravesites, the number of bodies, and how the victims died. Except for a few cases where the victims might have died due to warfare, most exhibited wounds caused by execution, many with their hands tied and rags stuffed into their mouths. Dr. Vennema wondered, “[D]id the men of the Front and their mentors in Hanoi think that they had the right to kill, as if any human being had the right to kill his fellow man?” (Vennema 1976, 183). “No matter what they hope to accomplish, the tragedy of Hue would forever be an indictment of their behavior” (ibid.). Dr. Vennema emphasized that there was no mistake in each of these killings. "The killings were not made out of rage, panic, or jusr prior to the retreat; they were premeditated. Most of them were marked persons whose names were already on the list to be exterminated, others because they were connected with the armed forces or with the Saigon government" (ibid., 184).

In addition to Dr. Vennema’s book, there are hundreds of witnesses and documents showing that the Mậu Thân massacre in 1968 was a brutal mass murder perpetrated by the communists following the communist policy in Hà Nội. Details of the gravesites and the bodies and various sources are carefully documented (See, for example, Vennema 1976; Cao-Đắc 2014a, 367-374).

Dr. Vennema passed away in 2011 in British Columbia, Canada. If Lê Phong Lan was sincere in her effort to seek the truth “in 10 years,” she would have interviewed him when he was alive, or at least she should have consulted his book. Lê Phong Lan proclaimed, “Somebody asked me if I made this documentary in a fair manner, I’d like to answer that I had to be fair because this is about my profession and my good name” (Lê 2013). Lê Phong Lan indeed has given a new meaning for the word “fair” or she has belittled her own good name, if she has one.

16. The exhibition of the land reform 1946-1957 (2014) attempted to cover up the crime of killing more than 170.000 innocent people:

On September 8, 2014, the Museum of National History opened the exhibition of the Land Reform 1946 – 1957 with the announcement: “The exhibition named the Land Reform 1946 – 1957 is an activity contributing to the propagandizing and education of the public mass, especially the young generation so that they can have a more correct view of the land revolution in the liberation of our people during 1946 – 1957” (Dân 2014). The exhibition displayed almost 150 items, original documents, and pictures about the land reform program in Northern Vietnam in the 1950s, but there was no display of any items about the execution of more than 170,000 victims.

The exhibition was scheduled to open to the public until the end of 2014. However, only after 4 days, the exhibition was closed with a peculiar reason of some “electricity issue” (Tuổi 2014a). The sudden closure of the exhibition indicates that the VCP has realized its foolishness when it tries to cover up the crime of executing more than 170,000 innocent victims. This time, the VCP can no longer deceive people with fraudulent words because the truth about the Land Reform campaign has been widely known through communication media and the Internet. 

The exhibition opens up the wounds of the brutal massacre of innocent people during one of the darkest periods in Vietnam history. It reminds living relatives of the victims of the pain they have endured for over half a century. Why did the government of the SRV want to do that?


The VCP has been in existence for more than eighty years thanks to three elements: fraud, brutality, and luck. There is nothing one can do about luck. It’s also hard to change the brutality trait of the communists. But fraud is its weakest link. It can be exposed. 

The VCP has never genuinely admitted they committed these historical fraudulent acts. This indicates that they will continue committing frauds and criminal acts. In fact, that is exactly what is happening right now in Vietnam. Furthermore, it takes time for a fraud to be discovered. Whatever the VCP is doing now may not be known until twenty, thirty, or fifty years later. Twenty years after the Vietnam War ended, the total casualties of North Vietnam were finally disclosed. Fifty years after the bloody land reform, the VCP disclosed the total number of executed landowners. Sixty years after the Lê Văn Tám incident, the true story emerged. Under the single-party system, without a check-and-balance mechanism, there is no way for the Vietnamese people to know what their government is doing. 

The “We Want To Know” movement, launched by the Network of Vietnamese Bloggers in September 2014 (Dân 2014b), demands the government to respond to the public about matters that affect the country’s sovereignty. With a deep culture of frauds and lies, coupled with its brutal and evil nature, the probability for the VCP to honor this request is virtually nil. However, the “We Want To Know” movement seems to be a clever disguise, unintentionally or purposely, for a more potent movement or a tactic to distract or mislead the VCP. Whatever its intention, there is nothing the VCP can do to the people who simply want to know what is going on with the country. At least it is a loud and clear message to the VCP that the Vietnamese people are no longer herbivores fearful of the evil hyenas. 

The “We Want To Know” movement implicitly has a complementary sister movement running in parallel: the “We Don’t Want To Know” or “We Don’t Care to Know” movement. This sister movement is directed toward the historical frauds that cover up past crimes by the VCP or distort the truth to embellish the communist image. 

Both movements send loud and clear messages to the VCP.

In fact, the Vietnamese people already shouted loudly and clearly the message “We Don’t Want To Know” or “We Don’t Care to Know” at the historical frauds of the movie "Sống Cùng Lịch Sử" and the Land Reform exhibition.

Next, there will be loud and clear shouts from the young Vietnamese population. 

The young people in Vietnam, especially college students, have often been criticized for being indifferent to the current situation in Vietnam and for having little concerns about the country’s future. This criticism is further deepened by the pro-democracy student-led protests in Hong Kong, dubbed the Occupy Central campaign or the Umbrella Revolution. While this criticism is partially right in that it reflects the apparent indifference or non-action of the young people in protests against the Chinese aggression in the East Sea and other pro-democracy demonstrations, it may be unfair. As victims, the young people in Vietnam first need to break the chains and shackles that lock up their mind and free themselves from the mental prison of the communists. This process takes time. It may be fast, in a few weeks or months, or slow, in a few years. But it can be done. Indeed, several young people have shown that they have already escaped the communist mental prison and are now struggling for democracy.

Once they are free, they will appreciate the meaning of patriotism. Hai Bà Trưng, Ngô Quyền, Lý Thường Kiệt, Trần Hưng Đạo, Lê Lợi, Nguyễn Huệ will no longer be only names in history books or characters in plays or movies. The Diên Hồng Congress, the battles of Bạch Đằng, Chi Lăng, Đống Đa will no longer be merely boring events of a remote past. They will suddenly realize the Vietnam history is part of their lives, what makes them who they are now, and who their offspring will be.

Then, without being told, they will stand up and act.

Yes, there will be loud and clear shouts from the young Vietnamese population. Their shouts will be like the majestic roars of the young lions and lionesses who return to take back their land from the evil hyenas.

And they will not just shout messages. They will accompany their messages with concrete acts.



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